


The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan emerges as a landmark event in the transformation of the nature of the Cold War tensions between 1979-1991. Although the invasion prompted a sudden crumbling of the superficial and ad hoc relations during the Cold War's détente of the 1960s-70s in a largely greater shift into multi-polar world, the USSR's inability to maintain the expansionist policy in ~~the~~ Afghanistan led to decline in the Cold War itself. Such factors which were related to the Soviet invasion and involvement of the in Afghanistan include the catalyst for the end of détente, the emergence of 'hot war' conflict which derailed détente philosophies, the redefining and stimulation of both US and USSR policies due

do its ramifications and finally the end of the Cold War, due the inability for the Soviet Union to ^{put more} pressure on their economic system as well as the tarnishing of international reputations.

The invasion of Afghanistan was the essential and ultimate catalyst for the ending of détente. As soon as Brezhnev invaded, Carter withdrew from the SALT II talks, which were never signed by the US Congress. Yet it should be noted that this was all it was, a catalyst. Previously to Carter, Ford demanded the word 'détente' be struck out from all his presidential speeches, emphasizing that détente failed to essentially dissolve fundamental tensions. Garthoff asserts that this is due to the fundamental discrepancies between Soviet and US interpretations of the




term 'détente', thus highlighting détente was already over or would be soon regardless of the invasion of Afghanistan's effect of the culmination of events. Indeed the brinkmanship which 'brought the world to the abyss of nuclear destruction' (R. Kennedy) during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Czechoslovakia uprising in 1968 being violently quashed by the Brezhnev Doctrine being implemented highlights the superficial pretext by which détente was formed. As put by Brezhnev, 'in the ideological field there can never be any peaceful coexistence'. It is true, however, that the eventual onset of 'hot warfare' effectively destroyed any chance of détente philosophies being implemented by this early stage.

The invasion of Afghanistan also emphasizes the pragmatic shift and widening of

The Cold War tensions beyond the euro-centric and German-centric preoccupations, particularly post to the implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. The Afghanistan conflict highlights the developments of shifting super-power interests in the Middle East. As the USSR remained the main Arab ally, particularly post to the results of the Suez Crisis in 1956 with Egypt the USA became the *de facto* ally of Israel during 1948, 1967 and in 1973. Similarly the ramifications of the overthrow of the US implemented (in 1953) pro-Western Shah of Iran in 1978/9 in Ayatollah's popularist revolution highlights the shifting boundaries of the Cold War. Both countries were being over exerted and it developed into the 'proxy wars' alliance systems of the 1950s being reinvented.

As well as 'Hot War' rivalries beginning to develop through the instability procured by the Third World it stimulated the reimplementation of ~~past~~ pre-defence policies from the 'Jacksonian perspective' (W.R. Mead) of superpower dominance, Reagan sought a 'spiritual revival' (Lightbody) of the 'Scarned and divided America' post the Vietnam War's failure by 1973.

This was stimulated by the invasion of Afghanistan. Reagan developed an exceptionally 'tough line' against the Soviet Union which many of the Reagan Victory school describe as instrumental to the end of the cold war. Historians such as Weinberger and Perle emphasize that 'the decisive technological edge' of the USA under Reagan (Devdney and Kenberry) ~~was~~ when coupled with the USSR's economic strain in Afghanistan



caused the collapse of the 'ambrosome machine' which 'stepped short of outright provocation' (R. V. Allen, Reagan's economic advisor). Reagan's rhetoric of the 'Evil Empire' combined with the neo-conservative alliances and policies with figures such as Margaret Thatcher proved to be vital in the end of the Cold War. S. Ambrose asserts that it was the vigilant adherence to the Truman Doctrine's philosophy of containment which helped strain the essentially flawed Soviet system. Such developments can be linked back to the disastrous invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR.

The end of the Cold War, however, is also considered the product of the rise of Gorbachev by March 1985, relinquishing the USSR from the paralysing gerontocracy which firmly adhered to the status quo.

Gorbachev's revolutionary policies essentially ended the long-time policy of Expansionism which was revitalised under the invasion of Afghanistan as a non Warsaw Pact country.

Gorbachev dismissed the essential reasons behind the incentive to invade Afghanistan. After Daoud's coup was overthrown and increasing rivalry between minorities within Afghanistan was exasperation, it was feared that the USSR's own minority groups such as Tajiks would become involved in the conflict, thus destabilising the poorly integrated central Asian and Middle Eastern regions of the Soviet Block. However, Gorbachev's reforms of glasnost and ~~the~~ democratisation encouraged the dissolution of the Soviet Block itself. Gorbachev encouraged the Velvet Revolutions also, as the long-time Brezhnev

Doctrine was replaced jokingly by the 'Sinatra Doctrine' which allowed the Soviet states to go their own way. Therefore, due to both a lack of ideological incentive and the economic decline of the USSR Gorbachev announced in 1988 the removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan as well as 100 000 troops and tanks from the Eastern Block.

As well as his practical removal from the Afghan mission, Gorbachev evoked a similar approach to rekindling of nuclear disarmament policies and 'novomysheleinie' or developing new foreign relations. Though Gaddis assents that it was economic reasons mainly contributing to the USSR's decline Larnes and Lane argue 'careful negotiation tactics... contributed decisively



in the end of Cold War conflicts. For these proactive steps Ganhoff asserts that 'In the end of a Soviet leader could have ended the Cold War and Gorbachev ~~the~~ set out deliberately to do so' as his 'reciprocal political accommodation' of Reagan and then Bush ended in nuclear disarmament, the primary problem in setting up tensions and antagonism.

After successive attempts at the Geneva Summit in 1985 and then the Reykjavik Summit of 1986, Gorbachev managed the signing of the INF Treaty which essentially removed an entire sector of nuclear weapons. The START I Treaty signed in 1991 was the product of cultivating successful relations with Bush in the Malta Summit of 1989. This highlights


The growing insignificance of the invasion of Afghanistan in the process of ending the Cold War as Gorbachev's removal of troops and the end of hostility to the west played an integral role.

Although under the Reagan Doctrine of 1981, the CIA secretly funded the anti-USSR mujahadeen terrorist group in Afghanistan such pretexts of proxy war, and the use of the containment policy were now irrelevant. Devdney and Kenberry highlight the complexity in Reagan's role when considering this as 'for ever 'hardening' there was a 'softening'" and he too played a role in the development of negotiation and diplomacy.

J. Feffer argues that although ~~the~~ Gorbachev played a key role 'one man did not change everything' and

partially evoked by the failure in Afghanistan and the general tarnishing of Soviet's ideological and economic appeal.

Therefore the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked a highly significant transformation of the Cold War conflict. In a growingly multi-polar, ~~glo~~ world with the onset of globalisation the Soviet invasion did more harm than any possible pragmatic gain initially envisaged. The invasion of Afghanistan cultivated not only the end of détente but new formed and revitalised aggression in the USA and the reversal of USSR policies under Gorbachev, due to the failure of the Afghan campaign. Therefore through the ultimate upheaval of



The ending of the cold war essentially 'reopened the task of public movements.' Under the more open media and political freedom in 'glasnost' the failure imminent in Afghanistan, with 37 000 soviet troops dead as well as the effects of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster became more widely appreciated causing public uproar and dissident voices. The failure of 'perestroika' and 'uskoreniye' became imminent when in 1989 soviet debt grew from 37 billion to 57 billion roubles. Such anger within public spheres led to the failed coup attempt against Gorbachev and Yeltsin's establishment of a separate Russian government. Therefore the crumbling of the Soviet Union played a key role in the end of the Cold war, and it was

the USSR the Cold war was brought to an end, as well as the simultaneous end of the USSR, by 1991.